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  Net Neutrality, Double Marginalization, and   Natural Monopoly in Internet Service
 

 
April 20, 2018

\bigskip


   Eric   Rasmusen  

{\it Abstract}

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   This paper explores two effects of net neutrality that might be expected to hurt consumers. First, it disallows contracts with transfer fees that could prevent double marginalization caused by the successive monopolies of content and service provision. Second, it reduces the profits of service providers, which results in small  markets being entirely unserved because the price to consumers is insufficient to reach zero profits and in larger markets being served by only one service provider because entry of a second provider would reduces profits below zero.  
 

\noindent
Rasmusen: Dan R. and Catherine M. Dalton Professor, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.   1309 E. 10th Street, Bloomington, Indiana, 47405-1701. (812) 855-9219.  
\href{mailto:erasmuse@indiana.edu}{ erasmuse@indiana.edu}, \url{http://www.rasmusen.org}.  
 
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\noindent
{\sc   The Meaning of Net Neutrality}

 There are two regulatory prohibitions commonly called  ``net neutrality''.
 
  The first bans internet service providers from providing faster service for some kind of   content thanothers.  A service provider could not, for example, prioritize long-distance surgery signals over the same number of packets of You-Tube video.  The provider could charge more only for generally faster service, to be sure, but could not discriminate based on the type of content.  
  
   The second prohibition is against service providers providing faster service to individual content providers based on discriminatory pricing.  

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\noindent
{\sc   Market Power}

     

The only  situation worth analyzing is  where both the content   company and the service provider have market power. 

Since content companies have differentiated products,   service provider natural monopolies are actually successive monopolies.

 Google picks a content price and Comcast picks a service price that the consumer pays.
 
  If we allow the two companies to charge prices to each other,  we create a bargaining game between the two, a game which might end up with Google paying Comcast for access to the consumer or  Comcast paying Google for access to the content.
  
  Industry belief seems to be that it would end up with Google paying Comcast.  
  
  
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\noindent
{\sc   Who Gets the Profits? }


  It seems to be a question of who should get more profits, and for economists that is the heart of the debate.
  
   If we deregulate, Comcast charges Google a fee, Comcast is richer, and service provision expands to new regions.
   
    If we require net neutrality, Comcast  can't charge Google and Comcast is poorer, but Google is richer and will innovate further in content.
    
     The question is which marginal elasticity of supply of innovation is greater, in markets or in content. 

   Robin Lee and Tim Wu make the argument for net neutrality that content providers need incentivizing in their 2009 {\it Journal of Economic Perspectives} article, but only verbally (though carefully and at length). Greenstein,  Peitz \&    Valletti (2016) have simple models illustrating the tradeoffs. 
    
    
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\noindent
{\sc    Two Simple Points }
    
  First: under net neutrality the successive content and service monopolies create double marginalization, but the transfer payments allowed by deregulation can allow the two monopolies to reduce the total price, to the benefit of consumers and themselves. 
  
   Second: since payments by the content provider to the service providers increases service profits, it both allows entry into markets otherwise unserved because they are too small (the deregulation advantage in the basic tradeoff just described), but also allows two service providers to fit profitably into a market where only one could otherwise survive.
   
    As a result, deregulation could reduce prices in already-served markets as well as cause new markets to be served. 

 
   
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\noindent
{\sc  2. The Model}

There is a continuum of consumers of size $m$ who buy internet service and internet content separately. 
The quantity  of internet service  demanded in the market  is the weakly concave function $m\cdot Q(p_s+ \Sigma_i^n p_{ci}  )$, where  $p_s$ is the price of service and $p_{ci}$ is the price of content $i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$.  

 There are two  potential service providers.      Each provider has a fixed cost $K_s$ and a constant marginal cost $c_s$. 

 There are $n$ content companies. Each has a 
fixed cost $K_c$ and a constant marginal cost $c_c$.  A content company pays lump sum amount $T$ to a service company to carry its product, where $T$ might be negative. 

 

   
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\noindent
{\sc  Policies}
  
  
Two government policies might be used: net neutrality, or deregulation. 
 Under net neutrality, $T=0$, and the prices $p_c$ and $p_s$ cannot depend explicitly on each other or on a consumer's purchase decision of any kind.  Under deregulation,  prices  can take any value, and it will turn out that    $T$  may be positive. 
 
  Question: Does net neutrality rule out contracts agreeing on prices between content company  and service providers?  Does deregulation allow it?  I will assume the answer to both is Yes. 


A service provider's payoff is 
\begin{equation} \label{e0}
\pi_s = m\cdot Q(p_s+ \Sigma_i^n p_{ci}  ) (p_s-c_s) - K_s + nT 
\end{equation}


A  content company's payoff is 
\begin{equation} \label{e0}
\pi_c =  m\cdot Q(p_s+ \Sigma_i^n p_{ci}  )  (p_c-c_c) - K_c - T 
\end{equation}

 
   
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\noindent
{\sc  Price Setting}

 We must model price setting in oligopoly for the service providers, whose product is undifferentiated.  We will use a general setting. Denote the monopoly service price as $p_s^*(p_{c1}, \ldots, p_{cn} )$, and let the duopoly price be $p_s^d(p_{c1}, \ldots, p_{cn} )$, and assume that the duopoly service  price is lower than the monopoly price given   identical content prices 

Assume  that service prices are also decreasing in expected values of $p_{ci}$.  but do not depend on $T$.

 Third, we implicitly assume that service prices do not depend on $T$ or $m$ by not including them  in the price functions.  
 
  We will assume that content companies choose their prices after the service providers choose theirs. 
  
  The service providers will make simultaneous take-it-or-leave it offers to the content companies. 
   


 
 

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\noindent
{\sc Model  1:   There is one content company.  }

Under net neutrality, we get double marginalization if there is room for just one service provider. If there is room for two, the content company gets more of the rents but not all of them, and there is still  double marginalization. 


 Under deregulation, we do NOT get double marginalization, either with 1 or 2 service providers. With 1 service provider, the content company pays the service providerr, who charges   


 With two service providers, the service providers will pay the content company. 

 The values of $m_1$ and $m_2$ differ depending on the regime. $m_1$ will be smaller under deregulation. $m_2$ will be bigger.

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\noindent
{\sc
Model 2.  There are 1,000 content companies, all valued equally by consumers. }

    

Under net neutrality, we get double marginalization with either 1 or 2 service providers. 

 Under deregulation, we do NOT get double marginalization.  $m_1$ will be smaller.  $m_2$ will be smaller.

 
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\noindent
{\bf References}

Choi, Jay Pil \& Byung-Cheol Kim (2010) ``Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives,'' {\it  RAND Journal of Economics}, 41:  446-471. 

Choi, Jay Pil, Doh-Shin Jeon \&   Byung-Cheol Kim (2015) ``Network Neutrality, Business Models, and Internet Interconnection, '' {\it American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}, 7: 104-141 (August 2015).

Economides, Nicholas \&  Benjamin E. Hermalin (2012) ``The Economics of Network Neutrality,'' {\it Rand Journal of Economics}, 43, 602-629. 

Greenstein, Shane ,  Martin Peitz \&  Tommaso Valletti (2016) 
``Net Neutrality:
A Fast Lane to Understanding the Trade-offs,''
{\it 
 Journal of Economic Perspectives}, 30:2, 127-150 (2016).


Katz, Michael L.  (2017) ``Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?'' Review of Industrial Organization,
50:4, 441-468.  

Lee, Robin \& Tim Wu (2009)  ``Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design: Zero-Pricing and Net Neutrality,''  {\it  Journal of Economics Perspectives}, 23: 61-76. 


 
Wright,  Joshua D.  (2015) 
``Net Neutrality Meets Regulatory Economics 101''.

  
 



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