Ramseyer-Rasmusen,"Judicial
Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan,"
4 October 2005
This file contains links to data and computer programs for the
following article:
J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen. Judicial
Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan.
, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
(1997) 13: 259- 286. Also published in Japanese as
``Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence
from Japan'' in Leviathan: The Japanese Journal of
Political Science (1998) 22: 116- 149 (see
this page ). Judges in Japan cannot be fired if their
decisions offend the government, but they follow a career
path in which the location and type of positions they hold
may be subject to political influence. We have obtained a
comprehensive record of career assignments for judges
educated after the Second World War. We couple data on
judicial output (the quantity and nature of a judge's
opinions) with these career records. We examine judges who
began their careers 1961-65, focussing on the Class of 1965,
for whom we have determined the number of pro- and anti-
government decisions. If the promotion process is
politicized, the marginal impact of individual politically
deviant cases will decline over the course of a judge's
career, since the political opinions of older judges have
already become clear to the administration. This does seem
to be the case in our logit regressions. In
Ascii-Latex
and Acrobat
pdf (
http://rasmusen.org/published/Rasmusen_97.JLEO.japan.pdf ).
Here are the files:
- The main data in
STATA and
Ascii with variable names in a separate file.
- The S138 election law data in
STATA and
Ascii with variable names in a separate file.
- The Stata command and output: the do
file and the log file.
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