Communism - Revision history

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Eric Rasmusen at 20:40, 15 March 2024

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 This is [[Havel I]].
-The essay is very good but very badly written.
+The essay is very good but very badly written. See [https://theworthyhouse.com/2018/05/18/book-review-power-powerless-vaclav-havel/ the 2018 Charles Haywood review] for something to read first, which also has applications to the situation in America in 2024 (yes, I know he wrote it 6 years earlier).
 In my abridgement (just first 15 chapters here, abridgement not completed):

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 Vaclav Havel: [https://web.archive.org/web/20120107141633/http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=72_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML "The Power of the Powerless"] (October 1978),Translated by Paul Wilson.
+This is [[Havel I]].
 The essay is very good but very badly written.
@@ Line 21: / Line 22: @@
 One legacy of that "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and  extremely flexible ideology that in its elaborateness and completeness is almost a religion. It fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in crisis, when people are uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it  and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’ s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (The connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual.) It is true of course that ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.
-Fourth,  exercising power in traditional dictatorships contains a necessary element of improvisation. The mechanisms for wielding power are   not established firmly  and there is considerable room for accident and for arbitrary and unregulated power. Socially, psychologically, and physically, conditions still exist for   some form of opposition. There are many seams on the surface which can split apart before the entire power structure has managed to stabilize. Our system, on the other hand, has been developing in the Soviet Union for  sixty years, and for   thirty years in Eastern Europe. Moreover, several of its long-established structural features   derive  from Czarist absolutism. This has led to the creation of such intricate and well-developed mechanisms for the   manipulation of the   population that    it represents something radically new. At the same time, let us not forget that the system is made significantly more effective by state ownership and central direction of the means of production. This gives the power structure an unprecedented and uncontrollable capacity to invest in itself (the bureaucracy and police, for example) and makes it easier for that structure, as the sole employer, to manipulate  day-to-day existence.
+Fourth,  exercising power in traditional dictatorships contains a necessary element of improvisation. The mechanisms for wielding power are   not established firmly  and there is considerable room for accident and for arbitrary and unregulated power. Socially, psychologically, and physically, conditions still exist for   some form of opposition. There are many seams on the surface which can split apart before the entire power structure has managed to stabilize. Our system, on the other hand, has been developing in the Soviet Union for  sixty years, and for   thirty years in Eastern Europe. Moreover, several of its long-established structural features   derive  from Czarist absolutism. This has led to the creation of such intricate and well-developed mechanisms for the   manipulation of the   population that    it represents something radically new. At the same time, let us not forget that the system is made significantly more effective by state ownership and central direction of the means of production. This gives the power structure an unprecedented and uncontrollable capacity to invest in itself (the bureaucracy and police, for example) and makes it easier for that structure, as the sole employer, to manipulate day-to-day existence.
-Finally, if an atmosphere of revolutionary excitement, heroism, dedication, and boisterous violence on all sides characterizes classical dictatorships, then the last traces of such an atmosphere have vanished from the Soviet bloc. For, some time now this bloc has ceased to be a kind of enclave, isolated from the rest of the developed world and immune to processes occurring in it. To the contrary, the Soviet bloc is an integral part of that larger world, and it shares and shapes the world's destiny. This means in concrete terms that the hierarchy of values existing in the developed countries of the West has, in essence, appeared in our society (the long period of co-existence with the West has only hastened this process)In other words, what we have here is simply another form of the consumer and industrial society, with all its concomitant social, intellectual, and psychological consequences. It is impossible to understand the nature of power in our system properly without taking this into account.
+Finally, if an atmosphere of revolutionary excitement, heroism, dedication, and boisterous violence on all sides characterizes classical dictatorship,  the last traces of such  atmosphere have vanished from the Soviet bloc. For  some time now, this bloc has ceased to be an enclave  isolated from the rest of the developed world. To the contrary, the Soviet bloc is an integral part of that   world  and  shares and shapes the world's destiny. The   values   of the West have  appeared in our society.  Wat we have  is simply another form of the consumer and industrial society. It is impossible to understand   power in our system   without taking this into account.
-The profound difference between our system-in terms of the nature of power-and what we traditionally understand by dictatorship, a difference I hope is clear even from this quite superficial comparison, has caused me to search for some term appropriate for our system, purely for the pur poses of this essay. If I refer to it henceforth as a "posttotalitarian" system, I am fully aware that this is perhaps not the most precise term, but I am unable to think of a better one. I do not wish to imply by the prefix "poso" that the system is no longer totalitarian; on the contrary, I mean that it is totalitarian in a way fundamentally different from classical dictatorships, different from totalitarianism as we usually understand it.
+The profound difference between our system  and  dictatorship  has caused me to search for some term   for it. "Posttotalitarianism"   is   not the most precise, but I am unable to think of a better one. I do not imply by   "post" that the system is no longer totalitarian; on the contrary, I mean that it is totalitarian in a way fundamentally different from classical dictatorship, different from totalitarianism as we usually understand it.

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-Vaclav Havel: [https://web.archive.org/web/20120107141633/http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=72_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML "The Power of the Powerless"] (October 1978), in my abridgement. Translated by Paul Wilson.
+Vaclav Havel: [https://web.archive.org/web/20120107141633/http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=72_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML "The Power of the Powerless"] (October 1978),Translated by Paul Wilson.
-−
+I

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 In the second place, if a feature of classical dictatorships is their lack of historical roots, the same cannot be said so facilely about our system. Even though our dictatorship has long since alienated itself completely from the social movements that give birth to it, the authenticity of these movements (I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century) gives it undeniable historicity. These origins provided a solid foundation on which it could build until it became the utterly new social and political reality it is today. A feature of those historical origins was the "correct" understanding of social conflicts in the period from which those original movements emerged. The fact that at the core of this "correct" understanding   was a genetic disposition toward the monstrous alienation characteristic of its subsequence development is not essential. This element also grew organically from the climate of that time and therefore can be said to have its origin there.
-One legacy of that "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and  extremely flexible ideology that in its elaborateness and completeness is almost a religion. It fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in crisis, when people are uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’ s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle involved here is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (In our case, the connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual authority.) It is true of course that, all this aside, ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.
+One legacy of that "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and  extremely flexible ideology that in its elaborateness and completeness is almost a religion. It fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in crisis, when people are uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it  and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’ s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (The connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual.) It is true of course that ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.
-Fourth, the technique of exercising power in traditional dictatorships contains a necessary element of improvisation. The mechanisms for wielding power are for the most part not established firmly, and there is considerable room for accident and for the arbitrary and unregulated application of power. Socially, psychologically, and physically, conditions still exist for the expression of some form of opposition. In short, there are many seams on the surface which can split apart before the entire power structure has managed to stabilize. Our system, on the other hand, has been developing in the Soviet Union for over sixty years, and for approximately thirty years in Eastern Europe; moreover, several of its long-established structural features are derived from Czarist absolutism. In terms of the physical aspects of power, this has led to the creation of such intricate and well-developed mechanisms for the direct and indirect manipulation of the entire population that, as a physical power base, it represents something radically new. At the same time, let us not forget that the system is made significantly more effective by state ownership and central direction of all the means of productionThis gives the power structure an unprecedented and uncontrollable capacity to invest in itself (in the areas of the bureaucracy and the police, for example) and makes it easier for that structure, as the sole employer, to manipulate the day-to-day existence of all citizens.
+Fourth,  exercising power in traditional dictatorships contains a necessary element of improvisation. The mechanisms for wielding power are   not established firmly  and there is considerable room for accident and for arbitrary and unregulated power. Socially, psychologically, and physically, conditions still exist for   some form of opposition. There are many seams on the surface which can split apart before the entire power structure has managed to stabilize. Our system, on the other hand, has been developing in the Soviet Union for  sixty years, and for   thirty years in Eastern Europe. Moreover, several of its long-established structural features   derive  from Czarist absolutism. This has led to the creation of such intricate and well-developed mechanisms for the   manipulation of the   population that    it represents something radically new. At the same time, let us not forget that the system is made significantly more effective by state ownership and central direction of the means of production. This gives the power structure an unprecedented and uncontrollable capacity to invest in itself (the bureaucracy and police, for example) and makes it easier for that structure, as the sole employer, to manipulate  day-to-day existence.
 Finally, if an atmosphere of revolutionary excitement, heroism, dedication, and boisterous violence on all sides characterizes classical dictatorships, then the last traces of such an atmosphere have vanished from the Soviet bloc. For, some time now this bloc has ceased to be a kind of enclave, isolated from the rest of the developed world and immune to processes occurring in it. To the contrary, the Soviet bloc is an integral part of that larger world, and it shares and shapes the world's destiny. This means in concrete terms that the hierarchy of values existing in the developed countries of the West has, in essence, appeared in our society (the long period of co-existence with the West has only hastened this process)In other words, what we have here is simply another form of the consumer and industrial society, with all its concomitant social, intellectual, and psychological consequences. It is impossible to understand the nature of power in our system properly without taking this into account.

@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 The system in which we live has very little in common with a classical dictatorship. In the first place, our system is not limited in a local, geographical sense; rather, it holds sway over a huge power bloc controlled by one of the two superpowers. Although it   exhibits a number of local and historical variations, the range of these variations is fundamentally circumscribed by a single, unifying framework. Each country has been completely penetrated by a network of manipulatory instruments controlled by the superpower center and totally subordinated to its interests. In the stalemated world of nuclear parity,   that circumstance endows the system with an unprecedented degree of external stability compared with classical dictatorships. Many local crises which, in an isolated state, would lead to a change in the system, can be resolved through direct intervention by the armed forces of the rest of the bloc.
-In the second place, if a feature of classical dictatorships is their lack of historical roots, the same cannot be said so facilely about our system. Even though our dictatorship has long since alienated itself completely from the social movements that give birth to it, the authenticity of these movements (and I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century) gives it undeniable historicity. These origins provided a solid foundation of sorts on which it could build until it became the utterly new social and political reality it is today. A feature of those historical origins was the "correct" understanding of social conflicts in the period from which those original movements emerged. The fact that at the core of this "correct" understanding   was a genetic disposition toward the monstrous alienation characteristic of its subsequence development is not essential here. This element also grew organically from the climate of that time and therefore can be said to have its origin there as well.
+In the second place, if a feature of classical dictatorships is their lack of historical roots, the same cannot be said so facilely about our system. Even though our dictatorship has long since alienated itself completely from the social movements that give birth to it, the authenticity of these movements (I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century) gives it undeniable historicity. These origins provided a solid foundation on which it could build until it became the utterly new social and political reality it is today. A feature of those historical origins was the "correct" understanding of social conflicts in the period from which those original movements emerged. The fact that at the core of this "correct" understanding   was a genetic disposition toward the monstrous alienation characteristic of its subsequence development is not essential. This element also grew organically from the climate of that time and therefore can be said to have its origin there.
-One legacy of that original "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and  extremely flexible ideology that  in its elaborateness and completeness is almost a   religion. It  fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in a state of crisis, when people are being uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’ s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle involved here is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (In our case, the connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual authority.) It is true of course that, all this aside, ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.
+One legacy of that "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and  extremely flexible ideology that in its elaborateness and completeness is almost a religion. It fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in crisis, when people are uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’ s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle involved here is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (In our case, the connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual authority.) It is true of course that, all this aside, ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.
 Fourth, the technique of exercising power in traditional dictatorships contains a necessary element of improvisation. The mechanisms for wielding power are for the most part not established firmly, and there is considerable room for accident and for the arbitrary and unregulated application of power. Socially, psychologically, and physically, conditions still exist for the expression of some form of opposition. In short, there are many seams on the surface which can split apart before the entire power structure has managed to stabilize. Our system, on the other hand, has been developing in the Soviet Union for over sixty years, and for approximately thirty years in Eastern Europe; moreover, several of its long-established structural features are derived from Czarist absolutism. In terms of the physical aspects of power, this has led to the creation of such intricate and well-developed mechanisms for the direct and indirect manipulation of the entire population that, as a physical power base, it represents something radically new. At the same time, let us not forget that the system is made significantly more effective by state ownership and central direction of all the means of productionThis gives the power structure an unprecedented and uncontrollable capacity to invest in itself (in the areas of the bureaucracy and the police, for example) and makes it easier for that structure, as the sole employer, to manipulate the day-to-day existence of all citizens.

@@ Line 10: / Line 10: @@
 II
-Our system is most frequently characterized as a dictatorship or, more precisely, as the dictatorship of a political bureaucracy over a society which has undergone economic and social leveling. I am afraid that the term "dictatorship," regardless of how intelligible it may otherwise be, tends to obscure rather than clarify the real nature of power in this system. We usually associate the term with the notion of a small group of people who take over the government of a given country by force; their power is wielded openly, using the direct instruments of power at their disposal, and they are easily distinguished socially from the majority over whom they rule. Its power derives ultimately from the numbers and the armed might of its soldiers and police. The principal threat to its existence is felt to be the possibility that someone better equipped in this sense might appear and overthrow it.
+Our system is most frequently characterized as a dictatorship or, more precisely, as the dictatorship of a political bureaucracy over a society which has undergone economic and social leveling. I am afraid that the term "dictatorship"  tends to obscure rather than clarify the real nature of power. We usually associate the term with a small group of people who take over the government by force; their power is wielded openly, using the direct instruments of power at their disposal, and they are easily distinguished socially from the majority over whom they rule. Its power derives ultimately from the numbers and the armed might of its soldiers and police. The principal threat to its existence is  the possibility  someone better equipped   might appear and overthrow it.
-Even this very superficial overview should make it clear that the system in which we live has very little in common with a classical dictatorship. In the first place, our system is not limited in a local, geographical sense; rather, it holds sway over a huge power bloc controlled by one of the two superpowers. And although it quite naturally exhibits a number of local and historical variations, the range of these variations is fundamentally circumscribed by a single, unifying framework throughout the power bloc. Not only is the dictatorship everywhere based on the same principles and structured in the same way (that is, in the way evolved by the ruling super power), but each country has been completely penetrated by a network of manipulatory instruments controlled by the superpower center and totally subordinated to its interests. In the stalemated world of nuclear parity, of course, that circumstance endows the system with an unprecedented degree of external stability compared with classical dictatorships. Many local crises which, in an isolated state, would lead to a change in the system, can be resolved through direct intervention by the armed forces of the rest of the bloc.
+The system in which we live has very little in common with a classical dictatorship. In the first place, our system is not limited in a local, geographical sense; rather, it holds sway over a huge power bloc controlled by one of the two superpowers. Although it   exhibits a number of local and historical variations, the range of these variations is fundamentally circumscribed by a single, unifying framework. Each country has been completely penetrated by a network of manipulatory instruments controlled by the superpower center and totally subordinated to its interests. In the stalemated world of nuclear parity,   that circumstance endows the system with an unprecedented degree of external stability compared with classical dictatorships. Many local crises which, in an isolated state, would lead to a change in the system, can be resolved through direct intervention by the armed forces of the rest of the bloc.
-In the second place, if a feature of classical dictatorships is their lack of historical roots (frequently they appear to be no more than historical freaks, the fortuitous consequence of fortuitous social processes or of human and mob tendencies), the same cannot be said so facilely about our system. For even though our dictatorship has long since alienated itself completely from the social movements that give birth to it, the authenticity of these movements (and I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century) gives it undeniable historicity. These origins provided a solid foundation of sorts on which it could build until it became the utterly new social and political reality it is today, which has become so inextricably a part of the structure of the modern world. A feature of those historical origins was the "correct" understanding of social conflicts in the period from which those original movements emerged. The fact that at the very core of this "correct" understanding there was a genetic disposition toward the monstrous alienation characteristic of its subsequence development is not essential here. And in any case, this element also grew organically from the climate of that time and therefore can be said to have its origin there as well.
+In the second place, if a feature of classical dictatorships is their lack of historical roots, the same cannot be said so facilely about our system. Even though our dictatorship has long since alienated itself completely from the social movements that give birth to it, the authenticity of these movements (and I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century) gives it undeniable historicity. These origins provided a solid foundation of sorts on which it could build until it became the utterly new social and political reality it is today. A feature of those historical origins was the "correct" understanding of social conflicts in the period from which those original movements emerged. The fact that at the core of this "correct" understanding   was a genetic disposition toward the monstrous alienation characteristic of its subsequence development is not essential here. This element also grew organically from the climate of that time and therefore can be said to have its origin there as well.
-One legacy of that original "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different from other modern dictatorships: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and, in essence, extremely flexible ideology that, in its elaborateness and completeness, is almost a secularized religion. It of fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in a state of crisis, when people are being uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’ s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle involved here is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (In our case, the connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual authority.) It is true of course that, all this aside, ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.
+One legacy of that original "correct" understanding is a third peculiarity that makes our systems different: it commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and  extremely flexible ideology that  in its elaborateness and completeness is almost a   religion. It  fears a ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and accepting it has profound implications for human life. In an era when metaphysical and existential certainties are in a state of crisis, when people are being uprooted and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’ s own reason, conscience, and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority. The principle involved here is that the center of power is identical with the center of truth. (In our case, the connection with Byzantine theocracy is direct: the highest secular authority is identical with the highest spiritual authority.) It is true of course that, all this aside, ideology no longer has any great influence on people, at least within our bloc (with the possible exception of Russia, where the serf mentality, with its blind, fatalistic respect for rulers and its automatic acceptance of all their claims, is still dominant and combined with a superpower patriotism which traditionally places the interests of empire higher than the interests of humanity). But this is not important, because ideology plays its role in our system very well (an issue to which I will return) precisely because it is what it is.
 Fourth, the technique of exercising power in traditional dictatorships contains a necessary element of improvisation. The mechanisms for wielding power are for the most part not established firmly, and there is considerable room for accident and for the arbitrary and unregulated application of power. Socially, psychologically, and physically, conditions still exist for the expression of some form of opposition. In short, there are many seams on the surface which can split apart before the entire power structure has managed to stabilize. Our system, on the other hand, has been developing in the Soviet Union for over sixty years, and for approximately thirty years in Eastern Europe; moreover, several of its long-established structural features are derived from Czarist absolutism. In terms of the physical aspects of power, this has led to the creation of such intricate and well-developed mechanisms for the direct and indirect manipulation of the entire population that, as a physical power base, it represents something radically new. At the same time, let us not forget that the system is made significantly more effective by state ownership and central direction of all the means of productionThis gives the power structure an unprecedented and uncontrollable capacity to invest in itself (in the areas of the bureaucracy and the police, for example) and makes it easier for that structure, as the sole employer, to manipulate the day-to-day existence of all citizens.