Difference between revisions of "Articles to read"
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2014), pp. 893-949 https://www.jstor.org/stable/43669490 | 2014), pp. 893-949 https://www.jstor.org/stable/43669490 | ||
| − | Cagé, J, A Dagorret, P Grosjean, and S Jha (2020b), “Heroes and Villains: The Effects of Combat Heroism on Autocratic Values and Nazi Collaboration in France,” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 15613. | + | Cagé, J, A Dagorret, P Grosjean, and S Jha (2020b), “Heroes and Villains: The Effects of Combat Heroism on Autocratic Values and Nazi Collaboration in France,” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 15613. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3753869 |
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| + | Lacroix, J, P-G Méon and K Oosterlinck (2019), “A positive effect of political dynasties: The case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act”, CEPR Discussion Paper 13871. https://www.eh.net/eha/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Oosterlinck.pdf | ||
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2019.03.002. | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2019.03.002. | ||
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==Other== | ==Other== | ||
Revision as of 21:48, 18 January 2021
"The Religious Commissions of the Bakongo," Wyatt MacGaffey Man , Mar., 1970, New Series, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), pp. 27-38 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2798802.
Political Economy
The Faces of Judicial Independence: Democratic versus Bureaucratic Accountability in Judicial Selection, Training, and Promotion in South Korea and Taiwan NEIL CHISHOLM The American Journal of Comparative Law , FALL 2014, Vol. 62, No. 4 (FALL 2014), pp. 893-949 https://www.jstor.org/stable/43669490
Cagé, J, A Dagorret, P Grosjean, and S Jha (2020b), “Heroes and Villains: The Effects of Combat Heroism on Autocratic Values and Nazi Collaboration in France,” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 15613. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3753869
Lacroix, J, P-G Méon and K Oosterlinck (2019), “A positive effect of political dynasties: The case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act”, CEPR Discussion Paper 13871. https://www.eh.net/eha/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Oosterlinck.pdf
The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)
Debin Ma Jared Rubin Journal of Comparative Economics
Volume 47, Issue 2, June 2019, Pages 277-294
Journal of Comparative Economics
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2019.03.002.
Other
Dal Bó, E, P Dal Bó and J Snyder (2009), “Political dynasties”, Review of Economic Studies 76(1): 115–42.
Ma, D (2004). "Growth, institutions and knowledge: a review and reflection on the historiography of 18th–20th century China". Australian economic history review (0004-8992), 44 (3), p. 259.
"From Divergence to Convergence: Reevaluating the History Behind China's Economic
Boom," Loren Brandt, Debin Ma and Thomas G. Rawski, Journal of Economic Literature , MARCH 2014, Vol. 52, No. 1 pp.
45-123. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24433858
States and Development: Early Modern India, China, and the Great Divergence Bishnupriya Gupta Debin Ma Tirthankar Roy
20 September 2016.
LAW AND ECONOMY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA: A "LEGAL ORIGIN" PERSPECTIVE ON THE GREAT DIVERGENCE," Debin Ma , https://personal.lse.ac.uk/MAD1/ma_pdf_files/DP8385.pdf.
"Foreign Education, Ideology, and the Fall of Imperial China," James Kai-sing KUNG† Alina Yue WANG‡ https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2021conference/program/pdf/13683_paper_dhQ7DbF9.pdf?display. This paper is an example of one with links between text mentions of papers and the reference section. But not two-way.
"Millet, Rice, and Isolation:
Origins and Persistence of the World’s Most Enduring Mega-State,"
James Kai-sing Kung=
, Omer ¨ Ozak
, Louis Putterman§
, and Shuang Shi¶
December 20, 2020. https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2021conference/program/pdf/13681_paper_96AHSRfe.pdf?display . Covered in the Frieden Tuesday Lunch.
We propose and empirically test a theory for the endogenous formation and persistence of large
states, using China as an example. We suggest that the relative timing of the emergence of agricultural societies and their distance to each other set off a race between autochthonous state-building projects and the expansion of neighboring (proto-)states. Using a novel dataset on the Chinese state’s historical presence, the timing of agricultural adoption, social complexity, climate, and geography across 1×1 degree grid cells in East Asia, we provide empirical support for this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that on average, cells that adopted agriculture earlier or were close to the earliest archaic state in East Asia (Erlitou) remained longer under Sinitic control. In contrast, earlier adoption of agriculture decreased the persistent control of the Chinese state in cells farther than 2.8 weeks of travel from Erlitou.
