Difference between revisions of "Parler's antitrust claim"
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| + | {{Quotation| After AWS took Parler offline, it did a very curious thing. Despite shutting down all of its services to Parler, | ||
| + | AWS left open Route 53, “a highly scalable domain name system (DNS) . . . , which conveniently | ||
| + | directed hackers to our backup datacenters and caused them to initiate a sizeable DNS attack.” | ||
| + | Matze Dec., ¶ 14. In other words, AWS essentially illuminated a large neon arrow directing | ||
| + | hackers to Parler’s backup datacenters. And the hackers got the message, launching an extremely | ||
| + | large attack—one 250 times larger and 12-24 times longer than the average DDOS attack.2 Later | ||
| + | AWS would terminate the Route 53 link, but the damage was done. And this AWS-facilitated | ||
| + | attack “essentially became a threat to all future datacenters that, if they were to host Parler, they | ||
| + | would be attacked by unprecedented hacks.” Matze Dec., ¶ 14. In short, AWS’s highly | ||
| + | publicized break from [its] contractual relationship [with Parler], when coupled with the toxic | ||
| + | notoriety of massive hacking attacks, has driven away nearly all . . . other hosting services that | ||
| + | Parler had hoped to use.” Matze Dec., ¶ 15.<br> | ||
| + | --Document 31a, Supplemental filing after TRO hearing. }} | ||
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Back to [[Parler company]] or the [http://rasmusen.org/parler/index.htm ''Parler v. Amazon''] website. | Back to [[Parler company]] or the [http://rasmusen.org/parler/index.htm ''Parler v. Amazon''] website. | ||
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Latest revision as of 16:47, 22 January 2021
After AWS took Parler offline, it did a very curious thing. Despite shutting down all of its services to Parler,
AWS left open Route 53, “a highly scalable domain name system (DNS) . . . , which conveniently directed hackers to our backup datacenters and caused them to initiate a sizeable DNS attack.” Matze Dec., ¶ 14. In other words, AWS essentially illuminated a large neon arrow directing hackers to Parler’s backup datacenters. And the hackers got the message, launching an extremely large attack—one 250 times larger and 12-24 times longer than the average DDOS attack.2 Later AWS would terminate the Route 53 link, but the damage was done. And this AWS-facilitated attack “essentially became a threat to all future datacenters that, if they were to host Parler, they would be attacked by unprecedented hacks.” Matze Dec., ¶ 14. In short, AWS’s highly publicized break from [its] contractual relationship [with Parler], when coupled with the toxic notoriety of massive hacking attacks, has driven away nearly all . . . other hosting services that Parler had hoped to use.” Matze Dec., ¶ 15.
--Document 31a, Supplemental filing after TRO hearing.
Back to Parler company or the Parler v. Amazon website.
