04.02.14a. Libertarianism; Moral Externalities, Altruism, and Property Rights in Actions. On February 8 I talked about how the assignment of property rights is an Achilles Heel for moralistic libertarianism. If John's 14-year-old son wants to commit sodomy, and John does not want him to, any system of ethics must allocate the property right over "Decision of whether John's son commits sodomy". John could decide; the son could decide; consent of both might be required for sodomy; consent of either might be required for sodomy; the government could decide; the boy's mother could decide; and so forth.

Which allocation of property rights is morally best is not obvious,an empirical claim that I make because different society's come down differently on it. In my earlier posting I claimed that before 1800, nobody thought that John's son should be the one to make the decision. I might be wrong on that--please let me know if you have examples. But do not misunderstand me. I did not say that before 1800 nobody believed that sodomy was good behavior, or that nobody engaged in it (two separate things). It is quite possible for somebody to like sodomy and approve of it but to believe that his son cannot engage in it without his approval. Think of the parallel to drinking whisky. There are plenty of people who drink whisky, and approve of drinking, but who think they have the moral right to block their child from drinking it (or, to permit their child to drink it--- in this example, I am supposing the parent has the property right, not the government).

One reader brought up a different twist. Isn't John in the wrong if he tries to block his son's sodomy, even while (for the sake of argument) agreeing that his son enjoys it and it has no bad consequences? If we strip off any argument from paternalism-- from John trying to do what is best for his son-- and leave only the fact that John for purely selfish reasons wants to stop his son's sodomy, doesn't that put John morally in the wrong?

It does not. The lack of altruism is symmetric. John is being selfish in being willing to deprive his son of the pleasure of sodomy. The son is being selfish in being willing to inflict the pain of his sodomy on John. We cannot, without adding other considerations, say that either person's self-interestedness is illegitimate. If each was totally unselfish-- but not self-sacrificing-- then he would try to calculate which of them valued the property right more, and use that as the basis for his decision. That is what utilitarianism does.

This last point is worth exploring. Suppose the pleasure of sodomy is worth $1000 to John's son, but causes John $1500 in displeasure. (You may use either dollars or "utils" as you please here.) Unbiased calculations would lead to them agreeing that the sodomy should not occur. If they were each to try to be self-sacrificing, it is unclear what would happen, because John would say "Forget about my happiness-- do it," and John's son would say, "Forget about my happiness-- I won't do it," and so they would be at an impasse.

My most important point here, however, is that it doesn't resolve the issue to say, "John shouldn't be selfish." That is too easy to answer with "John's son shouldn't be selfish."

[in full at 04.02.14a.htm . Erasmusen@yahoo.com. ]

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