... we have gone far enough, I believe, to document my point: justice is not a consistently applied principle, however arbitrary its choice; nay, justice is for Keeton and O'Connell a suitcase full of bottled ethics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of justice.Richard Posner makes a similar point in one of his books: we cannot predict that a liberal education and the study of ethics will make a person more virtuous, because in our sinful human way, we take advantage of it to construct better rationalizations to do the selfish things we'd otherwise feel guilty about. The educated and eclectic person can smugly mix-and-match: I will pick from Christianity when I want to tell someone to love their neighbor; from Nietzsche when I want to divorce my wife for self-fulfillment; from Zen when I want to support an irrational position; from Socrates when I think I can win an argument from logic. And after all this looping and evading, I will say that I am much more sophisticated than the poor lunk who just follows what his Bible says. Moving on: he states the neutrality of the economist (and its slippages) very well:
What originally attracted my attention was a cite to the next point, on fairness as a guide to policy:The economist accepts the basic values of the community-- subject to whatever minor distortion and persuasion he thinks he can get away with-- and these values are almost outside the range of serious debate. Very few public policies are uniquely determined by these basic values, however. If the basic value is the elimination of destitution, the policy which is chosen may be a homestead act or a minimum wage or a tariff or a food stamp plan or a negative income tax. The basic question of policy formulation for the economist is not whether the goal is desirable but whether the means are efficient. Is the end in view actually achieved, and at the least cost? This criterion of efficiency perrnits the economist to assert that a minimum wage law and a tariff are perverse in their effects upon the very poor and therefore such policies should be abandoned or used only to serve other values. The dividing line between efficiency in reaching an end, and the desirability of the end itself, is not so sharp as a terse statement will suggest, hut an unusually disciplined economist could discuss economic policy for an hour without spending more than ten minutes on preaching.
This reminds me of what Macaulay said about King Charles II of England: that Charles was so kind-hearted that he would always grant what the people near him wishes-- though those favors had to be paid for by the people who couldn't get a personal audience. The next two points are profound ones:We are highly aroused by specific outrageous instances of what we believe to be injustice but an injustice is a showing of a need for policy change much more than a guide to the method and sometimes even ihe direction of change. The disinterested motive, I suggest, that gives rise to the largest and most frequent departures from self-interest in public policy formation is sympathy. The compassion for the harshly treated readily overwhelms our sense of justice: the society would willingly add to the injustices heaped upon a millionaire if thereby the meager lot of an undeserving pauper is improved. Sympathy has been a generous source of public policy on labor relations, on the treatment of the indigent, and on the provision of public education. We are a highly sentimental people.
Both of those are classic Stigler--- simple thoughts that could occupy one's attention for a decade. I won't venture on them here.Let us pause for a moment to discuss the difficulty of disentangling and measuring the effects of an economic policy. Many lawyers and some economists will deny that it is possible, for example, to separate the effects of the S.E.C. review of stock prospectuses from the effects of higher taxes, more stable national growth, accelerating innovation, and a thousand other cirumstances that distinguished the 1950's from the 1920's. I would remind these doubters that if we cannot measure the effects of policies, the society is incapable of rational behavior--rational behavior is behavior appropriate to the ends in view, and means cannot be appropriate if their effects are unknown.
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The buyer wishes protection against defective and dangerous products and services. Poisonous food is an undiscussable example, but the same issue arises with the refrigerator that does not cool or the dentist who is clumsy and near-sighted. > It has not been so widely recognized that the seller may wish and deserve protection against incompetent or fraudulent buyers.
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