Primitive law regards the word and the act of the individual; it searches not his heart. " The thought of man shall not be tried," said Chief Justice Brian, one of the best of the medieval lawyers, " for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man." [ft2: Y. B. 7 Ed. IV, f. 2, pi. 2.]

> Suppose, however, that the defendant, instead of merely injuring his assailant, had killed him in self-defense, using no unnecessary force. Did the early English law so completely ignore the moral quality of the act of killing in self-defense as to make it a crime? Strictly speaking, yes. An official reporter of the time of Edward III[FOOTNOTE 3 Y. B. 21 Ed. Ill, f. 17, pi. 22.] and Lord Coke[FOOTNOTE 4 Coke, Second Inst., 148.] were doubtless in error in stating that prior to 1267 a man " was hanged in such a case just as if he had acted feloniously." But such killing was not justifiable homicide. The party indicted was not entitled to an ac�quittal by the jury. He was sent back to prison, and must trust to the king's mercy for a pardon. Furthermore, although he obtained the pardon, he forfeited his goods for the crime. But the moral sense of the community could not tolerate indefinitely the idea that a blameless self-defender was a criminal, or that he should have to make compensation to his culpable assailant. By 1400 self-defense had become a bar to an action for a battery. Pardons for killing in self-defense became a matter of course; ultimately the jury was allowed to give a verdict of not guilty in such cases, and the practice of forfeiting the goods of the defendant died out.