WHY DID AL QAEDA BLOW UP THE WORLD TRADE CENTER? Jack Hirshleifer pointed me to a good
article on that question which also says important things about belief and behavior
generally: Lee Harris's "Al
Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology" in Hoover's Policy Review. The central point is that Al
Qaeda was not engaged in purposeful terror, but in dramatic theatre, and they cared not
about the effect on us, but about the effect on themselves. Mr. Harris starts by
pointing out a flawed assumption in our thinking:
My friend did not disagree with me as to the likely counterproductive effects of such a
demonstration. Instead, he argued that this simply did not matter. His answer was that
even if it was counterproductive, even if it turned people against war protesters,
indeed even if it made them more likely to support the continuation of the war, he would
still participate in the demonstration and he would do so for one simple reason--because
it was, in his words, good for his soul.
What I saw as a political act was not, for my friend, any such thing. It was not aimed
at altering the minds of other people or persuading them to act differently. Its whole
point was what it did for him.
And what it did for him was to provide him with a fantasy--a fantasy, namely, of taking
part in the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors. By
participating in a violent antiwar demonstration, he was in no sense aiming at coercing
conformity with his view--for that would still have been a political objective. Instead,
he took his part in order to confirm his ideological fantasy of marching on the right
side of history, of feeling himself among the elect few who stood with the angels of
historical inevitability. Thus, when he lay down in front of hapless commuters on the
bridges over the Potomac, he had no interest in changing the minds of these commuters,
no concern over whether they became angry at the protesters or not. They were there
merely as props, as so many supernumeraries in his private psychodrama. The protest for
him was not politics but theater; and the significance of his role lay not in the
political ends his actions might achieve, but rather in their symbolic value as ritual.
In short, he was acting out a fantasy.
...
The man who bores us with stories designed to impress us with his importance, or his
intellect, or his bank account, cares nothing for us as individuals--for he has already
cast us in the role that he wishes us to play: We are there to be impressed by him.
Indeed, it is an error even to suggest that he is trying to impress us, for this would
assume that he is willing to learn enough about us to discover how best we might be
impressed. But nothing of the kind occurs. And why should it?...
...
The willing suspension of disbelief, which Coleridge had observed in the psychology of
the normal theatergoer, would be enlisted in the service of the Sorelian myth; and in
the process, it would permit the myth-induced fantasy to override the obvious objections
based on mundane considerations of reality. Thus 20th-century Italians became convinced
that they were the successors of the Roman Empire in the same way that a member of a
theater audience is convinced that Hamlet is really talking to his deceased father's
ghost.
...
The terror, which to us seems the central fact, is in the eyes of al Qaeda a byproduct.
...
So perhaps it is time to retire the war metaphor and to deploy one that is more fitting:
the struggle to eradicate disease. The fantasy ideologies of the 20th century, after
all, spread like a virus in susceptible populations: Their propagation was not that
suggested by John Stuart Mill's marketplace of ideas--fantasy ideologies were not
debated and examined, weighed and measured, evaluated and compared. They grew and spread
like a cancer in the body politic. For the people who accepted them did not accept them
as tentative or provisional. They were unalterable and absolute. And finally, after
driving out all other competing ideas and ideologies, they literally turned their host
organism into the instrument of their own poisonous and deadly will.
The assumption is this: An act of violence on the magnitude of 9-11 can have been
intended only to further some kind of political objective.
This is no more true of Al Qaeda than it is of people we know who do seemingly foolish
and bad things. In the 60's he had a friend who
...was planning to join what by all accounts was to be a massively disruptive
demonstration in Washington, which in fact became one.
Once we think of the world as a theatre, belief takes on a different look.
For us, belief is a purely passive response to evidence presented to us--I form my
beliefs about the world for the purpose of understanding the world as it is. But this is
radically different from what might be called transformative belief--the secret of
fantasy ideology. For here the belief is not passive but intensely active, and its
purpose is not to describe the world but to change it. It is, in a sense, a deliberate
form of make-believe, but one in which the make-believe is not an end in itself, but
rather the means of making the make-believe become real. In this sense it is akin to
such innocently jejune phenomena as "The Power of Positive Thinking," or even "The
Little Engine That Could." To say that Mussolini, for example, believed that fascist
Italy would revive the Roman Empire does not mean that he made a careful examination of
the evidence and then arrived at this conclusion. Rather, what is meant by this is that
Mussolini had the will to believe that fascist Italy would revive the Roman
Empire.
Thus,
The terror attack of 9-11 was not designed to make us alter our policy, but was crafted
for its effect on the terrorists themselves: It was a spectacular piece of theater.
This way of thinking explains something that has puzzled me a lot: Why did Al Qaeda
not follow up with small-scale bombings of restaurants and buses that would be easy,
low-risk, and highly effective at spreading terror? The reason:
A campaign of smaller-scale acts of terror would have no glamour in it, and it was
glamour--and grandiosity--that al Qaeda was seeking in its targets.
The idea also has policy implications.
Equally absurd, on this interpretation, is the notion that we must review our own
policies toward the Arab world--or the state of Israel--in order to find ways to make
our enemies hate us less. If the Ethiopians had tried to make themselves more likable to
the Italians in the hope that this would make Mussolini rethink his plans of conquest,
it would have had the same effect.
Note, too, that cancer ends up by killing its host organism, since cancer cannot survive
if it is too successful and chokes out healthy tissue.
The essay is very good. Mr. Harris also mentions William James's essay "The Will to Believe" and Thomas Mann's "Notes of an Unpolitical Man", which I guess I had better look at.
[ http://php.indiana.edu/~erasmuse/w/03.08.18a.htm ]