Monday, August 18, 2003

WHY DID AL QAEDA BLOW UP THE WORLD TRADE CENTER? Jack Hirshleifer pointed me to a good article on that question which also says important things about belief and behavior generally: Lee Harris's "Al Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology" in Hoover's Policy Review. The central point is that Al Qaeda was not engaged in purposeful terror, but in dramatic theatre, and they cared not about the effect on us, but about the effect on themselves. Mr. Harris starts by pointing out a flawed assumption in our thinking:

The assumption is this: An act of violence on the magnitude of 9-11 can have been intended only to further some kind of political objective.
This is no more true of Al Qaeda than it is of people we know who do seemingly foolish and bad things. In the 60's he had a friend who
...was planning to join what by all accounts was to be a massively disruptive demonstration in Washington, which in fact became one.

My friend did not disagree with me as to the likely counterproductive effects of such a demonstration. Instead, he argued that this simply did not matter. His answer was that even if it was counterproductive, even if it turned people against war protesters, indeed even if it made them more likely to support the continuation of the war, he would still participate in the demonstration and he would do so for one simple reason--because it was, in his words, good for his soul.

What I saw as a political act was not, for my friend, any such thing. It was not aimed at altering the minds of other people or persuading them to act differently. Its whole point was what it did for him.

And what it did for him was to provide him with a fantasy--a fantasy, namely, of taking part in the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors. By participating in a violent antiwar demonstration, he was in no sense aiming at coercing conformity with his view--for that would still have been a political objective. Instead, he took his part in order to confirm his ideological fantasy of marching on the right side of history, of feeling himself among the elect few who stood with the angels of historical inevitability. Thus, when he lay down in front of hapless commuters on the bridges over the Potomac, he had no interest in changing the minds of these commuters, no concern over whether they became angry at the protesters or not. They were there merely as props, as so many supernumeraries in his private psychodrama. The protest for him was not politics but theater; and the significance of his role lay not in the political ends his actions might achieve, but rather in their symbolic value as ritual. In short, he was acting out a fantasy.

...

The man who bores us with stories designed to impress us with his importance, or his intellect, or his bank account, cares nothing for us as individuals--for he has already cast us in the role that he wishes us to play: We are there to be impressed by him. Indeed, it is an error even to suggest that he is trying to impress us, for this would assume that he is willing to learn enough about us to discover how best we might be impressed. But nothing of the kind occurs. And why should it?...

Once we think of the world as a theatre, belief takes on a different look.
For us, belief is a purely passive response to evidence presented to us--I form my beliefs about the world for the purpose of understanding the world as it is. But this is radically different from what might be called transformative belief--the secret of fantasy ideology. For here the belief is not passive but intensely active, and its purpose is not to describe the world but to change it. It is, in a sense, a deliberate form of make-believe, but one in which the make-believe is not an end in itself, but rather the means of making the make-believe become real. In this sense it is akin to such innocently jejune phenomena as "The Power of Positive Thinking," or even "The Little Engine That Could." To say that Mussolini, for example, believed that fascist Italy would revive the Roman Empire does not mean that he made a careful examination of the evidence and then arrived at this conclusion. Rather, what is meant by this is that Mussolini had the will to believe that fascist Italy would revive the Roman Empire.

...

The willing suspension of disbelief, which Coleridge had observed in the psychology of the normal theatergoer, would be enlisted in the service of the Sorelian myth; and in the process, it would permit the myth-induced fantasy to override the obvious objections based on mundane considerations of reality. Thus 20th-century Italians became convinced that they were the successors of the Roman Empire in the same way that a member of a theater audience is convinced that Hamlet is really talking to his deceased father's ghost.

Thus,
The terror attack of 9-11 was not designed to make us alter our policy, but was crafted for its effect on the terrorists themselves: It was a spectacular piece of theater.

...

The terror, which to us seems the central fact, is in the eyes of al Qaeda a byproduct.

This way of thinking explains something that has puzzled me a lot: Why did Al Qaeda not follow up with small-scale bombings of restaurants and buses that would be easy, low-risk, and highly effective at spreading terror? The reason:
A campaign of smaller-scale acts of terror would have no glamour in it, and it was glamour--and grandiosity--that al Qaeda was seeking in its targets.
The idea also has policy implications.
Equally absurd, on this interpretation, is the notion that we must review our own policies toward the Arab world--or the state of Israel--in order to find ways to make our enemies hate us less. If the Ethiopians had tried to make themselves more likable to the Italians in the hope that this would make Mussolini rethink his plans of conquest, it would have had the same effect.

...

So perhaps it is time to retire the war metaphor and to deploy one that is more fitting: the struggle to eradicate disease. The fantasy ideologies of the 20th century, after all, spread like a virus in susceptible populations: Their propagation was not that suggested by John Stuart Mill's marketplace of ideas--fantasy ideologies were not debated and examined, weighed and measured, evaluated and compared. They grew and spread like a cancer in the body politic. For the people who accepted them did not accept them as tentative or provisional. They were unalterable and absolute. And finally, after driving out all other competing ideas and ideologies, they literally turned their host organism into the instrument of their own poisonous and deadly will.

Note, too, that cancer ends up by killing its host organism, since cancer cannot survive if it is too successful and chokes out healthy tissue.

The essay is very good. Mr. Harris also mentions William James's essay "The Will to Believe" and Thomas Mann's "Notes of an Unpolitical Man", which I guess I had better look at.

[ http://php.indiana.edu/~erasmuse/w/03.08.18a.htm ]

 


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