The web-log Valediction had a good post on Allende and Chile a while back that summarizes his downfall nicely, quoting from left-wing historians. Some excerpts on the question of legitimacy (much of the post is on how Allende wrecked the economy, which is a bit different issue):

In the presidential elections of 1970, Allende got 36.2% of the vote, Alessandri (National Party) 34.9% and Tomic (Christian Democratic Party) 27.8%. According to the constitution, the Chilean congress had to choose the president between the first and second finishers. The only way the Christian Democrats could vote for Allende was to assure themselves of the continuity of democracy, and in this regard they negotiated a political document, the Statute of Democratic Guarantees, that became one of the keys to understand how the drama ended.

...

Since Congress was dominated by the opposition majority, the Popular Unity unearthed old legislation from the short-lived Socialist Republic of 1932 --legislation which had never been repealed but that allowed only temporary requisition of firms that had gone bankrupt. Using this legislation in a not-that-legal way during his first year in power, Allende "gained almost complete control of the production of nitrates, iodine, copper, coal, iron, steel; about 90% of the financial and banking sector; about 90% of the financial and banking sector; almost 80% of exports and 55% of imports; as well as a substantial part of the textile, cement, metal, fishing, soft drink, electronics, and part of the distribution industries." (Roxborough, pp. 89-90). In 1969 the Chilean state already owned 33 big companies; by 1972, Allende had nationalized a total of 264, much more than the 91 the Popular Unity programme had promised and, finally, the Central Workers Confederation (CUT), controlled by the Communist Party, took advantage of the failed June 29, 1973 military coup to illegally take over most private companies. "In a single day, the number of companies taken over by the government nearly doubled, rising from 282 to 526. Allende not only does nothing to stop it, he calls for the workers to create el poder popular." (Sigmund, p. 215)

...

"Agricultural output undoubtedly declined because of diminution in the amount of land under cultivation. In the three years of the Allende regime, this total fell by about 22.4 percent. A �secret� report of the Socialist party in 1972 admitted that almost half of the land the Allende government had taken over in the agrarian reform was not being cultivated." (Alexander, p. 179)

...

The US adopted a tough line against the Chilean government at the end of 1971, when Fidel Castro visits Chile and stays for a month, clearly intervening in Chilean politics by speaking in support of Allende, calling the opposition "fascists" and calling democratic bastions such as a free press, elections and representative institutions "condemned by history as decadent and anachronistic." Also at that time, the terms of compensation for the expropriated US companies appeared as virtually confiscatory.

"The Popular Unity government was overthrown by its own bourgeoisie (and its political agent, the armed forces) when it became clear that there was a real threat to bourgeois society." (Roxborough, p. 114)

"I am now convinced --with the benefit of hindsight-- that even if the CIA had not been giving substantial financial support to the opposition, Allende would not have lasted a full six-year term unless he had drastically altered his policies, so long as the armed forces retained the autonomy and independence which they were guaranteed from the outset of his administration." (Sigmund, p. xii)

The final battleground between the Popular Unity and the opposition was Congress. The Christian Democrats introduced an amendment to the nationalization law, the amendment was approved and Allende vetoed it. The fight then translated to whether congress needed a simple majority or two-thirds to overrule the presidential veto. The "constitutional confrontation [was] likened by many to the one in 1891 between President Balmaceda and the Congress which had led to a bloody civil war." (Sigmund, p. 168). The impasse reached a point of crisis, the Supreme Court and the Controller General ruling that "[the veto] does not conform to the norms of the Constitution" (Alexander, p. 317). In June 1973, the Ministry of the Interior ordered the Carabineros (police) not to carry out court orders, and the Supreme Court wrote two "open letters to President Allende protesting the press campaign and asserting that nonfulfillment of court orders and the abuse of legal loopholes were leading to �the imminent breakdown of the judicial order.�

...

The Chamber of Deputies, by a vote of 81 to 45, had resolved

"to present to the President of the Republic and to the Ministers of State, members of the Armed Forces and of the Corps of Carabineros, the grave breakdown of constitutional and legal order in the Republic ... and to indicate to them, furthermore, that in view of their functions, of their oath of loyalty to the Constitution and the laws, and in the case of the Ministers, of the nature of the institutions of which they are high members, and the name of which they invoked upon becoming Ministers, it behooves them to put an immediate end to all of the de facto situations which infringe the Constitution and the laws, so as to conduct government action in legal channels and assure the constitutional order of our fatherland and the essential bases of democratic coexistence among Chileans." (Alexander, p. 318)

"It was later debated whether in any sense it provided a legal basis for military intervention.  It did not have the force of law ... The important thing about the 22 August resolution was that it could be interpreted as a moral basis for military intervention, so long as it was intended to �re-establish the rule of the constitution and the law.�  This marked a major turning-point in the relationship between Congress and the armed forces." (Moss, pp. 197-198)

Of course, this doesn't address the question of why the military stayed in power after the coup or whether the military was too hard on the Communists. But it's a good start.

[ permalink, http://php.indiana.edu/~erasmuse/w/03.08.31a.htm ]

To return to Eric Rasmusen's weblog, click http://php.indiana.edu/~erasmuse/w/0.rasmusen.htm.