An interesting passage from the
Summa Theologica,
1:8,
"Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?" with my boldfacing. Note in
reading
this that for Aquinas, the definition of an "article of faith" is something that cannot
be proven naturally, so, for example, the existence of God is not an article of faith
for him.
As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue
from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so
this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the
articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as
the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the
general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in
regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither
prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave
this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics,
can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent
will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no
dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred
Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one
who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of
the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with
heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article
of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of
divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles
of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections--if he has
any--against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since
the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the
arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are
difficulties that can be answered.
I extract several things from this. First, Aquinas is quite aware that in arguing with
different types of people, one must use different kinds of argument, establishing
whatever common ground exists before one starts. Second, even if one cannot convincing
argue for X, it may be possible to convincingly destroy another person's arguments
against X. Thus, rational argument between people such as atheists and
Christians who deny each others' premises can still be useful. Third, a Christian
confident that his beliefs are correct can be confident that arguments against his
beliefs are somehow fallacious and can be refuted by someone clever enough.
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