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References and Name Index for *Games and Information*

Forthcoming and unpublished articles and books have been assigned the years (forthcoming) and (unpublished). The page numbers where a reference is mentioned in the text are listed after the reference. The date of first publication, which may differ from the date of the printing cited, follows the author's name. Some publications (e.g., *The Wall Street Journal*) cited in footnotes in the main text but are not in the bibliography. In the case of newspapers, keep in mind that although page numbers are given, the exact page may differ among regional and time-of-day editions.

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¹xxx Footnotes starting with xxx are the author's notes to himself. Comments are welcomed. This section is 43 pages long.

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