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\begin{Large}

\begin{LARGE}  


\begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.1  ``The Prisoner's Dilemma''} 

 \begin{tabular}{lllccc}
  &       &             &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Column}\\
  &       &             &   {\it Deny}  &   & {\it Confess}     \\
  &   &  {\it Deny}      &     -1,-1 & $\rightarrow$  & -10, 0 \\
 & {\bf Row:} &&$\downarrow$& & $\downarrow$ \\
&  &       {\it   Confess}     &      0,-10  & $\rightarrow$  & {\bf -8,-8} \\  
\multicolumn{6}{l}{\it Payoffs to: (Row,Column).}
\end{tabular}                
\end{center}

 \end{LARGE}

 
\begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.2  ``The Battle of the Bismarck Sea''  }      

\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
             &           & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Kimura}\\
             &           &    North    &  &  South    \\
             &     North     &   {\bf 2,-2} &$\leftrightarrow$   &    $2,-2$    \\
{\bf   Kenney} &                 &    $\uparrow$     &      & $\downarrow$      \\
             &     South     &    $1,-1$ &$\leftarrow$   &    $3,-3$    \\
 & \multicolumn{4}{l}{\it  Payoffs to Kenney, Kimura.} \\
\end{tabular}     
\end{center}


    
 \begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.3   ``The Swiss Cheese Game''   } 

  
 \begin{tabular}{lllccc}
  &       &             &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Jones}\\
  &       &             &  {\it  Left}    &   &  $ Right$       \\
  &   &  $ Up$      &    {\bf  0,0} & $\leftrightarrow$  & {\bf  0,0} \\
 & {\bf Smith:} &&$\updownarrow$& & $\updownarrow$ \\
&  &    {\it Down }      &      {\bf  0,0}  & $\leftrightarrow$  & {\bf 0,0} \\  
\multicolumn{6}{l}{\it Payoffs to: (Smith, Jones).}
\end{tabular}                
\end{center}


\begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.4 ``Boxed Pigs''  }    

 \begin{tabular}{lllcc c}
                    &       &       &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf
 Small Pig}\\
                    &       &           & Press &  & Wait      \\
           & &Press& $ 5 ,1 $ & $\rightarrow$ &{\bf \fbox{4}, \fbox{4}} \\
     &{\bf Big Pig}&         &   $\downarrow$  &   & $\uparrow$    \\
       &       &   Wait  &  $\fbox{9}, -1 $ & $\rightarrow$  &  0, \fbox{0 } \\
   \multicolumn{3}{l}{\it Payoffs  to: (Big Pig, Small Pig).} & & \\
\end{tabular}          
\end{center}



   
\begin{center}
   {\bf Table 1.5 ``The Modeller's Dilemma'' }
 \begin{tabular}{lllccc}
  &       &             &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Column}\\
  &       &             &    $Deny$   &   &  $Confess $     \\
  &   &  $Deny$       &      \begin{picture}(10,15) 
\put(0,-2){\dashbox{3}(8,12) {\bf 0}}
\end{picture}, \begin{picture}(10,15) 
\put(0,-2){\dashbox{3}(8,12) {\bf 0}}
\end{picture} & $\leftrightarrow$  & $-10$,     \begin{picture}(10,15) 
\put(0,-2){\dashbox{3}(8,12) {0}}
\end{picture}  \\
 & {\bf Row:} &&$\updownarrow$& & $\downarrow$ \\
&  &         $ Confess $        &        \begin{picture}(10,15) 
\put(0,-2){\dashbox{3}(8,12) {0}}
\end{picture},-10  & $\rightarrow$  & {\bf \fbox{ -8},\fbox{-8}} \\  
\multicolumn{6}{l}{\it Payoffs to: (Row, Column).}
\end{tabular}                
\end{center}




\begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.6  ``The Battle of the Sexes'' } 
 
 \begin{tabular}{lllccc}
  &       &             &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Woman}\\
  &       &             &    $Prize \; Fight$  & & $Ballet$  \\
  &   &  $Prize \; Fight$   &  {\bf 2,1} & $\leftarrow$  & $-2$, 0 \\
 & {\bf Man} &     & $\uparrow$  & & $\downarrow$ \\
&  &       $Ballet$     &      $0$, $-2$ & $\rightarrow$  & {\bf 1,2} \\ 
 & & & &\\
\multicolumn{6}{l}{\it Payoffs to: (Man, Woman)}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


  

\begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.7  ``Ranked Coordination''  }  

 \begin{tabular}{lllccc}
  &       &             &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Jones}\\
  &       &             &    $Large$  & & $Small$  \\
  &   &  $Large$   &     {\bf 2,2} & $\leftarrow$  & $0,0$ \\
 & {\bf Smith} &     & $\uparrow$  & & $\downarrow$ \\
&  &       $Small$     &      $0,0$ & $\rightarrow$  & {\bf 1,1} \\ 
 & & & &\\
\multicolumn{6}{l}{\it Payoffs to: (Smith, Jones)}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


 
   

\begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.8  ``Dangerous  Coordination''   } 

 \begin{tabular}{lllccc}
  &       &             &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Jones}\\
  &       &             &    $Large$  & & $Small$  \\
  &   &  $Large$   &     {\bf 1,1} & $\leftarrow$  & $-1, -1$ \\
 & {\bf Smith} &     & $\uparrow$  & & $\downarrow$ \\
&  &       $Small$     &      $-1000, -1$ & $\rightarrow$  & {\bf 2,2} \\ 
 & & & &\\
\multicolumn{6}{l}{\it Payoffs to: (Smith, Jones)}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

 
  
 
\begin{center}
{\bf Table 1.9 ``A General Prisoner's Dilemma'' } 

 \begin{tabular}{lllccc}
  &       &             &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\bf Column}\\
  &       &             &    $Deny$   &   &  $Confess$      \\
  &   & $ Deny $      &     $R,R$ & $\rightarrow$  & $S,T$ \\
 & {\bf Row:} &&$\downarrow$& & $\downarrow$ \\
&  &         $Confess$         &    $ T,S $ & $\rightarrow$  & {\bf P,P} \\  
\multicolumn{6}{l}{\it Payoffs to: (Row, Column).}
\end{tabular}                
\end{center}


 \end{Large}
 
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