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          \begin{center}   
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         {\bf  Nuisance Suits  }\\   
  \end{large}   
            
\bigskip
 October 1, 1996  \\   
        \bigskip   
      Eric Rasmusen  \\   
        \vspace{ .7in   }
        {\it Abstract}   
        \end{center}   
            Nuisance suits can be defined a number of ways, explained a number 
of ways, and prevented in a number of ways. I survey them for the forthcoming 
{\it New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law},  London: Macmillan 
Press,  Peter Newman, editor. 

\vspace{ 32pt}
\begin{small}
          \noindent 
    Indiana University School of Business, Rm. 456,   
  1309 E 10th Street,   Bloomington, Indiana, 47405-1701.
Secretary, 812-855-9219, direct 812-855-3356   Fax: 812-855-3354.  Email:
Erasmuse@indiana.edu.  Web: 
http://ezinfo.ucs.indiana.edu/$\sim$erasmuse.\footnote{xxx Footnotes starting 
with xxx are my notes to myself for revisions.} 

I would like to thank Hwa-Hsin Chiang,  James Isaacs,  Peter Newman, J. Mark 
Ramseyer,  Steven Shavell, and Jeffrey Stake for helpful comments. 

 \end{small}   
   

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 One of the chief problems of court reform in recent years has been the nuisance 
suit or frivolous suit.   I will define  this as  
{\it a lawsuit with a low probability of success at trial,  brought even though  
the plaintiff  knows that his probability of prevailing   would not justify  his 
costs if   the judicial process   were to be   completed instantly.}   This  is 
one of many possible definitions,  and, as we will see,  trying to define the 
term helps to illuminate a variety of problems that arise in the courts.  Note 
too that I have chosen a definition which depends on  existing law and 
procedure;   a filing  that  is  a nuisance suit in one jurisdiction  might    
win   in another.  
   
 Let us begin with  a model  of a civil suit  in tort.  The plaintiff pays 
amount  $F$  to file suit  against the defendant, an amount meant to include all 
initial expenses.   The suit has probability $\alpha$ of prevailing and winning 
damages of $D$, facts known to both sides and the court.   The plaintiff then 
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to settle for  amount $S$.  If the defendant 
rejects, the plaintiff decides whether to go to trial at additional cost $c_p$ 
or to drop the suit. If he goes to trial, the defendant must pay  $c_d$ to 
defend himself.  What makes this a nuisance suit is that  $-F  -c_p +  \alpha 
D<0$.   In the extreme, the suit has no chance of winning, and $\alpha =0$. This 
is essentially the model of Shavell (1982).    (Note that all results below will 
carry through with more elaborate  settlement bargaining and when the parties 
are uncertain of the parameter values.) 


  \noindent
{\it  (1)   Settlement  extortion.}   One misconception  can  be dispelled 
immediately:  the idea that the plaintiff can  extract a settlement from the 
defendant  simply because the defendant has   greater costs of going to trial. 

Suppose  that     $c_d$ is large,    much larger than $c_p$,  and   $c_p > 
\alpha D$.    What will the settlement amount be? 


 The value to the defendant of not going to trial is  $\alpha D + c_d$.  The 
value to the plaintiff of   going to trial is  $\alpha D -c_p$.  One might think    
that the settlement would be between these values--   at the upper extreme,  
$\alpha D +   c_d$, with take-it-or-leave-it offers;  or  $\alpha D +(c_d-
c_p)/2$,  with   equal bargaining power.   That is false. The catch is that the  
plaintiff's threat to go to trial must be   credible, but  if his settlement 
offer is turned down,  he will give up rather than pay $c_p$ for a probability 
$\alpha $ of $D$.   Hence, the size of $c_d$ is   irrelevant. 


There are, however,    twists to the situation that can make the plaintiff's 
threat to go to trial credible, so suit-for-settlement becomes plausible.  
 
 
  \noindent
{\it   Sunk Costs.   }  Suppose  the plaintiff has sunk most of his costs up 
front.   Even though this is a nuisance suit, so $c_p + F > \alpha D$, it can 
also  be true that 
  $  c_p <   \alpha D $.    Then,  the threat to go   to trial is credible,  
once the plaintiff has paid $F$,  and  if $c_d$ is large, a  big settlement can 
be extorted. 

  Both   $F$  and $c_p$  may be  small in terms of opportunity cost, if not 
accounting cost,  because the  plaintiff has pre-paid  most of his legal costs.       
This could  occur, for example,  when the  plaintiff   pays a flat salary to his  
in-house   counsel,  though  only if  he has no other use for the counsel's 
time.   Pre-payment could, however,  be a strategic move, reversing the  typical 
advice  to  delay payments and hasten receipts.  Making   the cost $F$ 
irrecoverable, the plaintiff's threat to go to trial  becomes credible and his 
bargaining position improves.  

 The first model in which the timing of costs was crucial,  Rosenberg and  
Shavell (1985),  has a slightly different twist.   After the plaintiff pays $F$, 
the defendant must pay $c_d$ before the plaintiff pays $c_p$, because the 
defendant must  prepare some defence to the initial filing or lose by summary 
judgement, whereas the plaintiff can rest   on the merits until the actual 
trial.  This means that the plaintiff can offer to settle for $c_d$ immediately 
after filing, and the defendant will accept, even though both know that the 
plaintiff would never go to trial.  
 
  US  federal independent prosecutors illustrate the importance of pre-paid 
costs.  They have liberal budgets--  indeed, no fixed budgets at all--    so it 
is not surprising that  their results have been poor by comparison with  regular 
prosecutors.   Since the client has authorized the expenditure in advance, 
before the quality of the case is  determined by the prosecutor, the prosecutor 
has little incentive to  drop cases that are unlikely to win at trial.      
 
  It is worth noting as  an empirical matter that  even if a case is frivolous, 
the defendant is often  well advised to make heavy expenditures in defending 
himself.  An apt case   is  {\it Bonsignore v. City of New York}, 521 F. Supp 
394 (SDNY 1981).  The wife of a policeman   successfully sued the city   after 
he shot her, claiming the city was negligent in not requiring all policeman to 
take   tests for mental disorders.  Judge Sofaer upheld the jury verdict,  
noting  with disapproval that the city had brought no witnesses, whereas Mrs. 
Bonsignore had brought fifteen.  

\noindent
{\it  Divisible Costs.}  Bebchuk (1996) carries the idea of sunk costs   
further.    Suppose that  the plaintiff  cannot  pay his legal expenses first, 
but   both sides   incur  costs in  $T$ stages, and   at    $T-1$, once most 
costs are sunk, the plaintiff     finds it worthwhile to incur the costs of the 
last stage so as to  have a chance at the trial judgement. He can then extract a 
settlement.  Going back to   $T-2$, however,     the plaintiff would be willing 
to pay expenses of  that stage,   as the price of admission to  the profitable 
settlement of   $T-1$. The reasoning    continues back to  Stage 1.   The result 
is   like the  loser-pays ``dollar auction''   of  Shubik (1971), with 
settlement as an agreement by both players to exit a costly  rivalry that is 
profitable at each stage  but ruinous overall.        


  \noindent
 {\it     Defendant Ignorance.    }     Bebchuck (1988) points out that if the 
plaintiff knows $\alpha=0$  but the defendant does not, the plaintiff can bring 
suit and extort a  profitable settlement.   What is relevant to   the 
defendant's acceptance of  a settlement offer is the defendant's subjective 
probability of winning, not the plaintiff's, nor the true probability.    Even 
if the defendant  is uncertain of the probability, and  assigns positive 
probability to the plaintiff dropping the case if  no agreement is reached, the 
partially credible threat is still credible, if not quite as frightening.  

 The defendant's  disadvantage  can arise from two sources.    He might 
literally have worse information, especially before the discovery process 
begins.  Before discovery, the  tort defendant  usually has little evidence 
available with which to dispute the plaintiff's claims.      Or, he might not 
know the law, especially before he hires a lawyer.    Many stories exist of  
government regulatory claims  of this kind.  The agency   claims a violation 
where  it knows none exists,  threatening  prosecution unless the defendant's 
behaviour is changed.   Note that    such  suits  are never actually filed in 
court (though the plaintiff still incurs costs), and hence   court  reforms  
cannot help.  

    \noindent
 {\it    Incomplete Information about the Plaintiff.}  With positive 
probability,     the  plaintiff might be  irrational or motivated by one of the  
reasons  under heading (2) below.  All types of plaintiff will pretend to be of 
this litigious type.  Suppose there is a probability    $\beta$ that the 
plaintiff will go to trial even though  $c_p > \alpha D$.   The defendant's 
expected cost  from turning down the settlement offer is then $ (1-\beta) *(0) + 
\beta (\alpha D +  c_d)$.  Thus, the plaintiff can make a settlement demand of  
$\beta (\alpha D +  c_d)$, which might well exceed $F$, even if it is much 
smaller than $c_d$. 
 

    \noindent
{\it      Plaintiff  Reputation.}   The plaintiff might want to maintain a 
reputation for carrying out threats.  If there is even a very small probability 
that the plaintiff   is irrational--  much smaller than   necessary as a base 
for  the reason discussed in the previous paragraph-- the plaintiff can use it 
for leverage  to  support a reputation equilibrium in   the style of the   
Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson (1982)  ``Gang of  Four'' model.  For explanation 
of this subtle model, see    chapters 5 and 6 of Rasmusen (1994). The essential 
requirement is that the plaintiff expects to be in future litigation and  is 
willing to take a loss on the present case to preserve his reputation.    


    \noindent
 {\it  (2)  Reasons not involving settlement.}   Other nuisance suits seem to 
exist which are not brought solely in the hopes of extorting a settlement 
(though  a  generous settlement  is always welcome). 
   
     \noindent
{\it    Plaintiff Mistake.}   The plaintiff may not know  $\alpha$ is low.     
Mistakes always occur. In a sense, either $\alpha=0$ or $\alpha=1$,   and any 
suit that loses is a nuisance suit, ex post.   
    I will  only mention two  of the many reasons for mistakes.  1.  A man is 
not just a poor judge in his own case, but  often  a sincerely poor judge, 
unable to see what is obvious to others: that his suit is  hopeless.   This is 
the origin of the ``empty-head, pure-heart'' suit.      2.  The plaintiff   
faces an agency problem, because he relies on an  attorney's advice.   If the 
attorney is paid an hourly wage, he has incentive to  convince the plaintiff  to 
sue--  which is, of course, a major reason for contingency fees, though their 
dampening effect on the number of nuisance suits is little noted  (and  even 
reversed, somehow, in   the {\it Restatement of Torts} \S 675h).   One-third of 
zero,  plus a reputation for losing cases    is not  attractive to ambulance 
chasers.  
 
   \noindent
{\it     Benefits from Litigation. } It  may happen  that there is a  benefit 
just  from bringing the case-- the litigation cost $C$ is negative.    The {\it 
Restatement of Torts} , \S 676  (Propriety of Purpose)  has a good discussion of 
this.      The plaintiff may  derive utility from the disutility of the 
defendant-- a grudge suit.     The plaintiff may value the publicity, as is 
commonly suspected of public   prosecutors who bring sensational but legally 
dubious civil  or  criminal suits.  (This is distinct from  wanting a reputation 
for toughness for use in other court proceedings, discussed above.)    The 
plaintiff may value  the delay that litigation brings.  If the suit  includes a 
preliminary injunction,  or if the plaintiff can win with  a biased lower court 
even if he knows he will lose on appeal,    he  is able to delay    something 
costly, e.g.,   suffering the  death penalty.   In civil cases,  defendants may 
be able to  delay yielding up property or complying with rules.   Also, 
especially in land-use disputes,  delay may  enable a  litigant to  lobby to 
change the relevant law to his advantage.   
 

 \noindent
{\it    Indirect   Benefits from  Winning. }  An apparent nuisance suit may turn 
out not to be one when  indirect benefits to success are included.  These 
include the utility  of official vindication of one's cause, and  advantages in 
later legal proceedings. Failure to prosecute patent and copyright infringement 
can  waive the protection, and similar losses of rights occur in other areas of 
the law.  An appellate victory can establish a precedent that a plaintiff   can 
use in future litigation, or which changes the law in a way that he finds 
personally satisfying. 



   \noindent
{\it    Court Error and Unjust Law.} A somewhat different  explanation for  
meritless suits is court error (distinct from  defendant error, one of the 
earlier reasons).  Even it is true that $\alpha$ {\it should} be zero, it may be 
that $\alpha$ is positive because of court error.    Many suits that appear 
ridiculous  do win,  but while one is tempted to call  these nuisance suits,  
they do not fall under the definition of this article.   A suit may be a  long 
shot  and still have positive net expected value. 
In  {\it Bigbee v. Pacific Tel.}, 34 Cal. 3d 49 (1983), for example,   a man in 
a telephone booth   sued the phone company for improper design  and  maintenance 
because it was hard to  escape  as a drunk driver careened towards  him out of 
the street, over a  kerb, and  across  a  parking lot.  The California Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld his right to  a jury  trial.   Defending this suit 
against summary judgement was clearly not frivolous; it won  by a large margin, 
and hence    is not a nuisance suit.   The problem is not   procedure, but   
substance, and  the proper derogatory term  is    ``court  error'' or  ``unjust 
law,'' depending on   whether other courts would replicate the same bad result.    
Such suits, however, may make up the bulk of  what the public complains of as 
nuisance suits, as I explain in   Rasmusen (1995), and are  hard to remedy by 
procedural reform, as  Bebchuck  \& Chang (1996) explain. 

 
Any of   this second set of reasons to go to trial can be leveraged up  by the 
possibility of settlement. Once  the threat to go to trial  is credible,   the 
the plaintiff can demand a bigger settlement,  the prospect of  which makes 
filing suit in the first place more attractive.  
 
 Note also that  the second set of reasons does not  arise only  under the 
adversarial system of civil litigation.   They apply      to government-
sponsored criminal and civil suits  as well as  to suits brought for profit.   
The problem of nuisance suits extends beyond common-law countries and beyond  a  
profit-seeking plaintiff's bar.   



 \noindent
 {\it Solutions}. 
The goal of  reducing the number of  nuisance suits is often  confused with the 
entirely separate, and   dubious,  goal of reducing litigation. A reform such as 
the English Rule, which leads to    lower costs  for meritorious plaintiffs,  
could  actually increase the total amount of litigation.    For   efficiency and 
justice, this is good;  for   minimizing   court  caseloads, it is bad.  
 
  
\noindent
 {\it Fee-Shifting Rules}.  The American rule is that each  litigant pays his  
own legal fees, except in unusual cases such as those covered by the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976, where plaintiffs can recover 
their costs, and in the state of Alaska   (see Wade  1986: 487).  The English 
rule is that  the loser pays.   There is a large literature in economics on 
this,  surveyed in Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989).  By reducing the payoff at 
trial, the English Rule reduces the credibility of threats to go to trial with 
meritless suits.  
 
    
\noindent
 {\it Procedural Rules.} These rules  delegate  the deterrence of nuisance suits 
to  the judge    in the  original  proceedings, subject to review by higher 
courts.    

   First, the rules on how suit is brought can make nuisance suits difficult.   
These include rules on standing, limiting who can bring suit; on forum shopping,  
preventing plaintiffs from  going to sympathetic or corrupt judges; on  removal, 
allowing defendants to avoid such judges; on pleadings, requiring a specific-
enough filing that its lack of merit is apparent; on evidence,  barring hearsay 
and limiting expert testimony;  and on discovery, limiting the demands each 
litigant can impose on the other.  See Olson  (1991) (for America), and the 
Woolf Report  (1996) (for England and Wales)   for discussion of these  rules, 
highly legalistic and  largely ignored by economists.    Given these rules, the 
judge has the ability to  dismiss suits by summary judgement.   

Second,   the judge can punish as well as dismiss.   Courts have inherent powers 
to control bad-faith conduct, and the US Supreme Court has  on this basis upheld  
sanctions even for acts outside the courtroom. {\it Chambers v. Nasco}, 501 US 
32    (1991).  In addition,  judges are  often granted statutory powers.   The  
Federal  statute  28 USC. \S 1927 allows fee-shifting under certain 
circumstances,   Federal tax rule 26 USCS  \S 6673    assesses penalties for 
frivolous or dilatory proceedings, and many states have similar  statutes.       
The best-known   sanction in the United States   is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1983.  It says, in  the concise 1983 version  
(expanded less elegantly in  the 1993 amendments) that an attorney may only file 
suit if   
      \begin{quotation}
 \begin{small}
``...to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.''
   \end{small}
 \end{quotation}
     Imposition of   Rule 11 sanctions is common, but although the  1993 
amendments, the Supreme Court,  and many economists  have emphasized that its 
purpose is deterrence,  lower courts seem to pay little attention.   They tend 
to  use the sanctions for  compensation to the     aggrieved party, and only 
after a  motion by that party.   
See {\it Cooter \& Gell v. Hartmarx}, 
496 US 384, 393 (1990),    Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1993), and, for  further 
analysis of the 1993 amendments,  Kobayashi \& Parker  (1993).   
 
 
  It is frequently observed  that  a good    rule  can be bad policy when 
applied by uncooperative  judges.  Judges      often condone, or even   praise,    
aggressive litigation.  See  {\it Golden Eagle v. Burroughs}, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th 
Cir., 1986) and {\it  Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles},  780 F. 2d 823 (9th 
Cir., 1986), which admire  Rule 11 in the abstract while overruling it  in  
particular cases, or      {\it Eastway  v. City of New York }, 637 F. Supp. 558 
(E.D.N.Y 1986), in which  an unhappy  trial judge required by an appellate court 
to impose Rule 11 sanctions decided to include only attorney's fees, and to 
reduce them from  \$58,550 to \$1,000 because of mitigating factors.    Perhaps  
as  a surrender  to this kind of  judge  nullification, Rule 11 was amended in 
1993 to  say that the trial judge {\it may} rather than {\it shall}  impose 
sanctions.   
  More study needs to be done of judges'  motives, both personal and political;   
Macey  (1994) is one step in this direction. 

 
\noindent
 {\it Tort Rules. }    If legislatures and judges are unwilling to stop nuisance 
suits, the public might be able to rely on the plaintiff's bar,  resorting to   
judo tort reform which uses  the opponent's  strength and momentum against him.  
A nuisance suit is   an injury,   often   intentional, and reckless by 
definition.  Can the victim sue?  

  Economists have not addressed this topic, but    Wade (1986) has  an excellent 
survey of state law.     Judges have been uniformly hostile to suits   brought   
on general tort  grounds of negligent harm, but this is perhaps because of the 
existence of   special causes of action for  malicious prosecution, both 
criminal and civil.        What their effect has been is unclear, but    suits 
for civil malicious prosecution  lose much of their force in the absence of  the   
English Rule on costs,  unless they can obtain punitive damages  as in  {\it 
Bertero v. National General Corp.}, 13 Cal. 3d 43  (1975).  
 

\noindent
 {\it Conclusion. }  Law-and-economics research in the area of nuisance suits 
has been  active since the early 1980's, but though  it  has illuminated   
extortionary settlement and   the effects of fee-shifting, it has neglected  
many  other aspects of the problem.  Perhaps the biggest   blanks are in the 
areas of public choice theory  and   theory-driven empirical study.    Reforming 
a system against the inclinations of those who staff it is no easy problem, but   
scholarship has concentrated on the effect of  successful proposals rather than   
implementation.    The incentives of litigants are studied in great detail; the 
incentives of judges,  not at all.      Empirical work would also be helpful, 
particularly to  delineate the extent of the problem and which of the many  
plausible explanations   for nuisance suits are most common in practice.   



%---------------------------------------------------------------
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\noindent
 STATUTES   

28 USC  \S 1927 (fee-shifting under unusual circumstances)

USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 11 (1996),  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  \S 11   
(sanctions for frivolous suits)


26 USCS  \S 6673 (1996) (tax court sanctions for frivolous suits)

42 USC 1988, Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976 (plaintiffs can 
recover their costs) .

\bigskip
\noindent
  CASES


{\it Bertero v. National General Corp.,} 13 Cal. 3d 43  (1975)  (punitive 
damages can be assessed for malicious civil prosecution)

 {\it Bonsignore v. City of New York}, 521 F. Supp 394 (SDNY 1981) (wife shot by 
policeman sued city)

  {\it   Bigbee v. Pacific Tel.,} 34 Cal. 3d 49 (1983) (suing the telephone 
booth maker) 

 {\it Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,} 780 F 2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).  (extent 
of frivolity that requires Rule 11 sanctions)


   {\it Golden Eagle v. Burroughs, }801 F2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986)  (false 
statements  per se cannot be sanctioned by Rule 11)

 {\it Eastway  v. City of New York }, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y 1986)
  
  {\it Cooter \& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,} 496 US 384  (1990)  (Rule 11 is meant 
to  deter)

  {\it Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.,} 501 US 32    (1991) (inherent court powers)


\bigskip

\noindent
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

 American Law Institute (1977) {\it Restatement of the Law, Second:
Torts 2d}, St. Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute, 1977.  

  Bebchuk, L.  1988.    Suing solely to extract a settlement offer.  {\it 
Journal of Legal
Studies}     17:   437-450.

 Bebchuk, L.  1996.    A new theory concerning the credibility  and success of 
threats to sue.  {\it Journal of Legal
Studies}     25:   1-26.

 Bebchuk, L.  and Chang, H. 1996.    An analysis of fee shifting based on the 
margin of victory: On frivolous suits, meritorious suits, and the role of Rule 
11.  {\it Journal of Legal
Studies}     25:   371-404.

                           
Cooter, R. and Rubinfeld, D.  1989. 
 Economic analysis of legal
disputes and their resolution.  {\it Journal of Economic Literature}    27:    
1067-1097.

Kobayashi, B. and  Parker, J.  1993. No armistice at 11:A commentary on the 
Supreme Court's 1993 amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. {\it Supreme Court Economic Review} 3: 93-152. 

 Kreps, D.,   Milgrom, P.,   Roberts, J. and  Wilson, R.  1982.  Rational 
cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners'
dilemma.   {\it Journal of Economic Theory }      27:       245-52.

Macey, J. 1994. Judicial preferences, public choice, and the rules of procedure. 
{\it Journal of Legal Studies} 23: 627-646. 

   
Olson, W.  1991.  {\it The Litigation Explosion. }  New York: Penguin Books.  
 
 Polinsky, A.M. and Rubinfeld, D. 1993.  Sanctioning frivolous suits: An 
economic analysis.  
 {\it Georgetown Law Journal} 82: 397-435. 
                                  
 Rasmusen, E. 1994. {\it Games and Information,} Second Edition. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.

   
Rasmusen, E.   1995. Predictable and unpredictable error in  tort awards: The 
effect of plaintiff self selection  and signalling.      {\it  International 
Review of Law and Economics}    15: 323-345.
   

Rosenberg. D. and Shavell, S. 1985.    A model in which lawsuits
are brought for their nuisance value.  {\it International Review of
Law and Economics}   5:  3-13.

 
    Shavell, S. 1982.   Suit, settlement, and trial: A theoretical analysis 
under alternative methods for the allocation of legal costs.  {\it Journal of 
Legal Studies} 11: 55-81.  

Shubik, M. 1971. ``The dollar auction game: A
paradox
in noncooperative behavior and escalation'' {\it Journal of
Conflict
Resolution }     15:      109-11.


 Wade,  J.  1986. On frivolous litigation: A study of tort
liability and procedural sanctions. {\it Hofstra  Law Review} 14: 433
-497. 


Woolf.   1996. {\it   Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on 
the Civil Justice System in England and Wales }.     Selborne House, 
54-60 Victoria Street, 
London.

\noindent
 {\it Notes for the  Editor}
   
 Crossfile under: 

FRIVOLOUS SUITS. 

 RULE 11. 

  PROCEDURE.

  SETTLEMENT. 

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.  

This draft has   3244  words in main text and 
584 words in the bibliography.
 
  Suggested length: 3000 words plus up to 450 for bibliography.  

 I could cut out the paragraph on independent prosecutors and the parenthetic 
explanations of the meaning of cases. 
 
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