Rasmusen's Scanned-In Papers, January 7, 2004


This page links to various of my papers that I've scanned onto my computer.


  1. Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan. (with Mark Ramseyer), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1997) 13: 259- 286. Also published in Japanese as ``Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan'' in Leviathan: The Japanese Journal of Political Science (1998) 22: 116-149 (see this page ). Judges in Japan cannot be fired if their decisions offend the government, but they follow a career path in which the location and type of positions they hold may be subject to political influence. We have obtained a comprehensive record of career assignments for judges educated after the Second World War. We couple data on judicial output (the quantity and nature of a judge's opinions) with these career records. We examine judges who began their careers 1961-65, focussing on the Class of 1965, for whom we have determined the number of pro- and anti- government decisions. If the promotion process is politicized, the marginal impact of individual politically deviant cases will decline over the course of a judge's career, since the political opinions of older judges have already become clear to the administration. This does seem to be the case in our logit regressions. In Ascii-Latex (91K) and pdf (261K, Rasmusen_97.JLEO.japan.pdf).

    Leviathan pages (in Japanese)

    1. Page 116
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    3. Page 129
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    10. Page 135
    11. Page 137

  2. ``Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected By Incentives?'' Journal of Theoretical Politics , (July 1992), 4: 343-357 (with Jack Hirshleifer). Tsebelis proposed that in games such as the "Police Game" that have only a mixed strategy equilibrium, changing a player's payoff parameters will not affect his behavior. Care must be taken not to push this reasoning too far.

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  3. ``Recent Developments in the Economics of Exclusionary Contracts,'' Chapter 16 (pp. 371-388), Canadian Competition Law and Politics at the Centenary , edited by R. Khemani and W. Stanbury. Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991. A short survey of ideas on exclusive-dealing contracts.

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    10. Page 388

URL: http://pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/published/scanned.htm Indiana University, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, in the Kelley School of Business , BU 456, 1309 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47405-1701, (812)855-9219. Comments: Erasmuse@Indiana.edu.

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