Expectation damages are supposed to make the professor whole, no worse off than if the breach of contract had not occurred. But this leads to a paradox. The professor wants to argue that his market value is very low-- that he is such a bad professor that he couldn't get nearly as good a job anywhere else. The university wants to argue that the professor's market value is very high-- that he is such a good professor that he could get a better job, and so the damages are zero. Thus, the arguments from the liability stage are reversed.

This seems to be a good situation for requiring specific performance-- requiring the university to hire back the professor. But it is also a situation in which it is hard to enforce specific performance, because the job relationship is poisoned. The returning professor will not have as good relations as before with administrators and perhaps colleagues, might not get the raises he deserves, and so forth. A ticklish problem. There are lots of cases in this situation-- sexual harassment ones, perhaps, denied tenure cases, etc. I just don't know what is done.

[in full at 04.03.29a.htm ]

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