The Brown opinion replaced the rule that had evolved from the 1893 case of Plessy
v.
Ferguson that segregation by states was permissible so long as it did not result in
unequal treatment of blacks and whites (which would violate the Equal Protection Clause)
. Instead, Brown said that school segregation, in particular, violated the Equal
Protection Clause whether the facilities were equal or not, because segregation
denigrated blacks. Brown elaborated on this by saying that modern psychology showed
that segregation resulted in blacks feeling inferior and citing a number of academic
publications-- in particular, the "doll studies" of Kenneth Clark, an anti-segregation
activist.
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the
law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child
to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy
v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. [Footnote: K. B.
Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury
White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in
the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced
Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What
are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3
Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in
Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., (1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in
the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944)
.] Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
(1) Was the psychology and sociology of 1950 trustworthy? Of course not. I wouldn't
rely on most of it even today. At trial, John Davis had "demolished" Kenneth Clark's
doll study, Alexander Bickel said (Kluger, p. 707). I bet the rest of the sources cited
are similarly worthless and biased. In fact, even if it were true that
"segregation with the sanction of law, has a tendency to retard
the educational and mental development of negro children," that would have been near
impossible to establish by a scientific study. If nothing else, how would such a study
have determined whether the inferior performance of the negro children was due to (1)
segregation per se, (2) inferior schools, since the "separate but equal" rule was
flagrantly and hugely violated, (3) genes, or (4) home environment?
It would be much easier to show that there was no scientifically detectable adverse effect of segregation (that is, even if the effect existed, no truly scientific study had shown it). Thus, if scientific evidence was crucial to the Brown holding, Brown was wrongly decided, and should be reversed. In the absence of any scientific evidence that segregation per se hurt black children, the courts should, under this reasoning, defer to the states.
But in fact the Brown Court merely flourished the social science references for show,
and I bet they didn't care a whit what the scientific evidence was. As Richard Kluger
writes in Simple Justice, p. 706,
To Warren, it had seemed an innocuous enough item to insert in the opinion. "We
included it because I thought the point it made was the antithesis of what was said in
Plessy," he later commented. "They had said there that if there was any harm intended,
it was solely in the mind of the Negro. I though these things-- these cited sources--
were sufficient to note as being in contradistinction to that statement in Plessy. "
Then he added, by way of stressing that the sociology was merely supportive and not the
substance of the holding, "It was only a note, after all." Warren's clerk Earl Pollock,
one of those closest to the writing of the opinion, puts it more bluntly: "The only
reason to have included footnote number 11 was as a rebuttal to the cheap psychology
of Plessy that said inferiority was only in the mind of the Negro. The Chief Justice
was saying in effect that we know a lot more now about how human beings work than they
did back then and can therefore cast doubt on that preposterous line of argument."
This is a good illustration of the naivete of the 1950s American liberal: the idea
that his beliefs were modern and scientific and therefore he could dismiss the wisdom of
the ages. I certainly would prefer to trust the judgement of a random college-
educated person-- or of a randomly drawn professor-- from 1893 about how people think
than someone from 1950.
Justice Tom Clark later said (by Kluger's report) that he and Justice Hugo Black had warned the Chief Justice that including the cite to Myrdal, a leftwing Swede highly critical of the South, was a slap in the face to Southerners and would make it harder to enforce the opinion. Since the Chief Justice, an ex-governor famous for his skill at political manipulation, did it anyway, my guess is that he wanted to slap the Southerners in the face, whether for spite or because he hoped the backlash would help build Northern support.
In this, I go contrary to the Volokh Conspirators.
Eugene Volokh
As I understand it, some of the studies on which Brown has relied on have indeed
been
questioned. But it seems to me that Brown was both right to consider social science
evidence, and to reach the result that it did as to deliberate, legally enforced racial
segregation.
Also, on the question of whether the Brown decision was based on the Fourteenth
Amendment or on social science evidence, my understanding has always been that the Court
threw in the social science evidence as a way of placating the white South. Instead of
saying, "you guys are racist pigs who have been oppressing blacks for three hundred
years," which would have been apt but impolitic, the Court said, "you segregated blacks
in public schools at a time when you didn't know how harmful it was to them. Now that
modern social science evidence has demonstrated the harm, of course you wouldn't want to
continue this segregation."
David Bernstein
said
(2) At any rate, the footnote was just an example of bad writing and dishonest rhetoric.
What Justice Warren could have done instead was just to say "In my judgement,
segregation per se hurts the performance of black schoolchildren." Courts have to decide
that sort of thing on weak evidence all the time, so it is not so objectionable. In
fact, I would trust Justice Warren's intuitions about people far more than the
publications he cited.
But I wouldn't trust Warren's honesty, and I don't think he believed that segregation hurt the performance of black schoolchildren. Indeed, if that were the holding, then a showing that segregation helps performance-- which is equally plausible-- would make segregation okay. I don't think he really meant that.
Rather, what I think Warren really meant is what
Eugene Volokh
states much better than the Brown opinion:
The Plessy majority's endorsement of "separate but equal" rested on the view that
the
social message of segregation was irrelevant:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act,
but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not
so
much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. . . . The thing to
accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to
compel the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches.
No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.
In brief: segregation was intended and received as an insult to blacks.
This strikes me as quite unpersuasive, and it didn't persuade Justice Harlan, either:
The law, Harlan reasoned, "proceed[ed] on the ground that colored citizens are so
inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by
white citizens[.] That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as
was enacted in Louisiana." It seems to me that he was correct. And he was also right to
be attentive to the clear message that a law sends, rather than just its tangible
effects.
That argument has two problems, though. First, I believe it is empirically false. Suppose nobody had perceived segregation as an insult to blacks. Would white southerners then have thought there was no point in banning interracial marriage, separating children in school and employees in workplaces, having separate bathrooms, and so forth? Of course not. To some mild extent the purpose of segregation was to insult blacks, but for the most part that was a by-product, if, from the white viewpoint, a desirable one. Indeed, I can think of no theory under which it would be the main reason. Why insult blacks, except for racism? But a racist would want segregation quite independently of whether it had the effect of insulting blacks, because, being a racist, he would not want to share a bathroom with a black.
Furthermore, the insult theory misses what I find the most plausible explanation for
most segregation: the desire of politicians to help whites, who voted, at the expense
of blacks, who did not. Since schools were not, in fact, equal, segregation allowed the
politicians to have higher school funding for whites than for blacks. The effect of
workplace segregation was similarly to help whites at the expense of blacks, though in a
more complicated way (if there are 10 blacks and 50 whites in town qualified for a
certain factory job, and you are not allowed to mix races, then you will only hire
whites). Plessy was right to allow "separate but equal" in principle, but in practice we now
know that the Plessy rule is unworkable. The federal courts should not get into the
business of administering school budgets and monitoring the quality of bathroom
facilities-- it would take too much of our time, and we would not do a good job anyway.
Instead, we will use the blunter but more practical rule that segregation is forbidden.
(3) This brings us, finally, to a good reason for holding that segregation is
unconstitutional: that although "separate but equal" is possible in theory, in
practice, it didn't happen and couldn't be made to happen. Between 1893 and 1954, it
became clear that segregated facilities were rarely if ever equal. The line of federal
lawsuits leading up to Brown, in fact, played on this point, and states were starting to
upgrade their black colleges, for example, because of the increasing number of court
challenges. The rational choice theory of politics tells us that the inequality of
facilities was predictable: by the 1890's, blacks had stopped voting (because of
intimidation, mostly), and so the state government was unresponsive to them. In theory,
unequal grade school facilities could have been challenged in court, but court
challenges are expensive, the facts would be specific to every little school district,
and it would be hard for courts to monitor compliance. A wiser Brown court would have
said,
... [in full at 04.05.20a.htm]
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