We follow the half-semester schedule used for graduate classes in the business school. Hence, G751 goes up until Spring Break, with its test on the last class day before the break. Its successsor course, G752, will start immediately after spring break.
I've posted questions from old tests at Questions 1 and Questions 2. You can also find answers to the two tests from this semester in that directory.
The pdf slides I used for this class from a previous year are in the directory http://www.rasmusen.org/g751/slides-g751 but I expect I'll use the board instead this time.
A. Game Structure and Equilibrium: definitions, dominated and dominant strategies, iterated dominance, Nash equilibrium, focal points. (Chapter 1).
B. Information: strategic and extensive forms, information sets, imperfect information, incomplete information, Bayesian games, application to litigation. (Chapter 2)
C. Mixed and Continuous Strategies: mixed strategies, games of timing, randomizing, continuous
strategies, strategic substitutes and complements, equilibrium existence. Applications to auditing
and pricing strategies. (Chapter 3)
D. Dynamic Games: subgame perfection, credibility, renegotiation. Applications to entry deterrence
and extortion. (Chapter 4)
E. Reputation and Repeated Games: finitely repeated games, indefinitely repeated games, reputation.
Applications to bargaining, branding, quality assurance, incentives. (Chapter 5)
E. Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information: Entry deterrence, equilibrium refinements, common knowledge, credit risk (Chapter 6).
F. Fundamentals: history of thought (readings here), theory of the firm(readings here) practical research skills (LaTeX, HTML, R) (readings here) and data presentation (readings here).
Learning Outcomes. What students will learn in this course is to read scholarly work using the techniques of game theory and how to apply those techniques in their own work. This will involve learning the use of specific concepts such as subgame perfectness, extensive forms, backwards induction, the computation of mixed strategies, and the theory of repeated games.